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Introduction 
Realizing the Human Experience: 
Vulnerability & Human Suffering 
 
Human relationships have long been the focus of scholarly attention.  Whether it is an 
examination of the non-instrumental relationships which sustain the quotidian existence 
of individuals throughout the world, or the more central relationships of power, 
legitimacy, and authority which feature in the development of governmental structures 
relationships at a very basic level, shape the human experience.  Throughout history 
different aspects of relationships have played a key role in developing an account of this 
experience which is, throughout this work, referred to as ‘the political’.  ‘The political’ 
refers to the sight where the actions and interactions of politics unfold.  Ancient and pre-
modern political thought displays a balanced appraisal of both the instrumental and non-
instrumental relationships within this sphere.  In fact, to distinguish between these 
different types of relations was, for philosophers like Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, 
an unnecessary scholarly endeavor.1  The modern turn in political and moral philosophy, 
as this work will document, reflects a changing series of assumptions which outline the 
demarcation of public and private realms of action which distinguish between personal 
and public relationships.2  Modern political thinkers, represented in the ideas of the social 
                                                 
1
 This is a point that is well noted by Preston King and Graham M. Smith “Friendship in Politics” Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 10 no. 2 (June 2007),125-145 and “Introduction” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 10 no. 2 (June 2007), 117-123.  They 
articulate how the idea of a ‘private life’ is at odds with ancient understandings of the political community 
which supported the development of individuals as moral beings.  The notion of a public and private divide, 
they go on to show is very much a modern phenomenon.  The diminishing influence of the Aristotelian 
notion of civic friendship in the formal discourses of politics reflects this modernist turn.   
2
 This idea is well documented in the writings of feminist scholars.  They note, and challenge, the 
distinction of public and private lives and the ensuing idea that a public sphere is dominated by a male 
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contract tradition, reflect an attempt at institutional design which locates a pre-eminent 
role for instrumental relationships.3  Such a focus provides a means of limiting the 
negative consequences of being human in common; however, this focus has revealed 
alternative consequences which are likewise equally problematic.   In the absence of non-
instrumental relationships within a formal account of ‘the political’ an understanding  of 
the ideas, values and goals with support and sustain the unique personalities of 
individuals, within the community, is otherwise absent.  This work acknowledges, in the 
opening chapters, the dominance of instrumental relationships within the broad field of 
International Relations4; however, it seeks to engage with this phenomenon and proposes 
an account of being political which situates the knowledge associated with non-
instrumental relationships as equal and valuable components within an account of being 
human, in common, which emphasizes the relationality of politics.   
 
A relational ontology which structures an account of ‘the political’ is at odds with formal 
accounts of international politics.  International Relations has long since abandoned the 
idea of relationality focusing instead on the instrumental roles of power and authority in 
order to engage with its pre-eminent concern; anarchy.  Consequently, as Hollis and 
Smith point out, most works within IR can be situated within a fourfold schema which, 
while loosely conceptualized, identifies either an individual or holistic point of origin 
                                                                                                                                                 
persona while a feminine experience is left to exist within the private sphere. This idea is documented 
through an analysis of ‘care ethics’ in Chapter Four.   
3
 From an historical perspective these tradition is reflected in the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke 
and Jean Jacques Rousseau.  The influence that this tradition has had on IR and international politics will 
be revealed, in Chapter One, through an examination of the development of ius gentium in the modern age 
and the idea of a domestic analogy in contemporary international politics.   
4
 Throughout this work International Relations (IR) will reflect the formal academic discipline of 
International Relations whereas international relations (ir) will reflect the discourses which examine the 
practices therein.  Likewise the events under examination within IR will be referred to as international 
politics.   
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which can explain or understand international politics.  Explanatory approaches, they 
argue, reflect a philosophical interpretation of the scientific method.  On the other hand, 
scholars who seek to understand international politics work from within the discipline 
itself eschewing the idea of impartiality and unbiased interpretations of unfolding events.5  
An examination of the historical development of IR reveals that throughout its relatively 
short history these different methodologies have exerted a considerable degree of 
influence.  The early years of IR demonstrate a desire to understanding the events of 
international politics as scholars sought to blend the disciplines of history, philosophy, 
law in order to engage with the events of diplomacy.6  This approach was called into 
question after the Second World War which ushered in the behavioralist revolution.  This 
methodology espoused the rigor of impartiality and objectivity in order to determine how 
states, the primary actor of international politics, could maintain their survival and 
security within the climate of the Cold War.7  Broadly speaking this turn engendered a 
series of scholarly ideas which coalesce, in North American, with the academic discipline 
of Political Science and espouse a framework of impartial and unbiased instrumental 
relationships.   
 
                                                 
5
 Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
6
 This is well documented within introductory texts to IR.  See for example Chris Brown, Understanding 
international relations, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to 
international relations: theories and approaches, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and finally, 
Michael Nicholson, International relations: a concise introduction, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).  A good 
investigation of how all of these fields can come together is evident in the edited text by Herbert Butterfield 
and Martin Wight, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, (Boston: 
Harvard University Press, 1968).   
7
 An excellent description of this unfolding of events alongside a heartfelt criticism is offered by Thomas 
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
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Events in the United Kingdom unfurled in a somewhat different manner.  They reveal a 
sympathetic interpretation of more ‘understanding’ approaches to international politics.  
A description of this idea begins with the works of ‘English School’ scholars.  Such a 
descriptive account prefaces an examination of contemporary normative works in order 
to situate a relational account of ‘being political’.  The English school is represented 
through the works of Hedley Bull, Herbert Butterfield, and Martin Wight.  All of these 
authors were interested in the relationship that ethics could play within international 
politics and examined the practices of conflict and diplomacy in order grapple with the 
tense relationship of morality and international politics.8  Their examinations provided a 
critical response to the philosophical structuring of politics within a scientific 
methodology.  Yet their ideas share some similarities with their North American 
counterparts.  They works are structured by an examination of instrumental relationships 
which highlight the potential of international law and world order to establish a series of 
rules which, in the absence of a foundational account of morality, could guide state 
behavior and mitigate anarchy.  Martin Wight is keen to establish means of classifying 
international political theories.  He questions the idea of International Theory and instead 
identifies three thematic interpretations of international politics; Machiavellian, Kantian, 
and Groatian.  On the other hand Hedley Bull investigates the possibility of a ‘Classical 
Account’ of international politics while engaging with the discourses of world order and 
inter alia anarchy.9  Herbert Butterfield is slightly distinguished from this generalization 
                                                 
8
 This point is well documented by Adam Watson who provides an excellent overview of the idea of an 
English school approach.  See, “The British Committee for the Theory for International Politics,” Leeds 
University, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/watson98.doc (accessed September 27, 2005).   
9
 See for example Martin Wight, International theory: the three traditions, Gabriele Wight and Brian 
Porter, eds., with an introductory essay by Hedley Bull (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1991); “Why is there no International Theory?” International Relations, 1 
no. 2 (1960), 1-35; and “An anatomy of international thought” Review of International Studies, 13 no. 3 
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owing to his interest in the relationship of Christianity and history, the philosophy of 
history and international relations.10  As a whole the importance of these authors is 
twofold.  They challenge a natural law approach, which is advocated throughout this 
work.  Consequently, a brief exposition of both their own works is helpful in order to 
engaged with traditional critiques of IR and natural law morality.  Likewise, it is 
instructive to look at the contemporary influence of the English school and its bearing on 
wider normative interpretations of international politics.    
 
An English school agenda stagnated during the Cold War years.  It was reignited as a 
research agenda in the early 1990s by Barry Buzan and Richard Little with the 
publication of “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR”.  This article 
argued that an English school approach could stem the tide of liberal and realist 
interpretations of international politics articulating the idea of an international system of 
civilized states.11  As Tim Dunne points out in his examination of this political tradition 
the English school can be understood as representing a consensus within international 
politics which recognizes the centrality of states  and articulating at the same time a series 
of rules, norms and institutions which are viewed as legitimate by all.12  This idea echoes 
the idea of Hedley Bull who claims that international conflict, when systematically 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1987), 221-227.  For Hedley Bull see, The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977); “International theory: the case for a classical approach” World 
Politics, 18 no. 3 (1966), 361-377; and finally, “Order vs. Justice in International Society”  Paper delivered 
to the Annual Conference of the P.S.A. at Birmingham, March 1971.   
10
 See for example the inclusion of Herbert Butterfield’s chief work, The Whig Interpretation of History, 
(New York & London: Norton, 1965); or, his contributions to Wight & Butterfield.  The legacy of 
Butterfield within IR is well documented by Ian Hall, “History, Christianity and diplomacy: Sir Herbert 
Butterfiled and international relations” Review of International Studies, 28 no. 4 (2002), 719-736. 
11
 Barry Buzan, “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR” Review of International Studies, 
27 (2001), 471-488.   
12
 Tim Dunne, “Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist and Coercive Interpretations of 
International Society” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30 no. 1 (2001), 67-91; and, Inventing 
international society: a history of the English School, (London: Macmillan, 1998). 
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analyzed can be controlled through properly understood rules and regulations articulated 
through the discourses of international law.13  The English school remains a contested 
and troubled theoretical framework for some scholars of IR.  Ian Hall has questioned the 
value of this framework which, he claims, marginalizes the important distinctions in and 
amongst its seeming members.14  Alternatively, Nicholas Rengger highlights the point 
first made in the 1970s by E.B.F. Midgley.15  English School advocates, they both claim, 
cannot provide a solid foundation upon which the legitimacy of their claims rest.16   
 
The emergence of this particular framework, regardless of its internal quarrels reflects a 
wider series of changes within the discipline.  It established the necessary space in which 
a normative focus on international politics concerned primarily with moral and ethical 
interpretations and responses to international politics could emerge.  Scholars such as 
Chris Brown17, Molly Cochran18, Mervyn Frost19 and Janna Thompson20 all provide 
works which fall broadly into the category of normative international politics.  They each 
confront the idea of morality and ethics within IR and provide, in their own way, an 
                                                 
13
 Hedley Bull, “Natural Law and International Relations” British Journal of International Studies, 15 no. 2 
(1979), 171-181.   
14
 Ian Hall, “Still the English Patient?  Closures and inventions in the English school” International Affairs, 
77 no. 4 (2002), 931-942.  This work elicited a dynamic response from Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 
“The ‘English patient’ strikes back; a response to Hall’s mis-diagnosis” International Affairs, 77 no. 4 
(2002), 943-946.  They claim that Hall misunderstands the idea of the English school and ‘misrepresents 
the idea of an international system in world history’.   
15
 E. B. F. Midgley, “Natural Law and the ‘Anglo-Saxons’: Some Reflections in Response to Hedley Bull” 
British Journal of International Studies 5, no. 3 (1979): 260-272. 
16
 Nicholas Rengger, International relations, political theory and the problem of order: beyond 
international relations theory?  (London: Routledge, 2000).   
17
 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992); Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: international political theory today, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2002). 
18
 Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
19
 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in international relations: a constitutive theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996).   
20
 Janna Thompson, Justice and world order a philosophical inquiry, (London: Routledge, 2002).   
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account of moral institutional design.  Normative works within IR can be located within 
the junction of moral philosophy, political theory and international politics.  Like most 
scholarly works within this field these studies engage with the assumed centrality of the 
state, yet question this particular state of affairs and ponder the historical idea of the polis 
and the possibility of a cosmos.  There is within this works a nod towards to the 
possibility of ethical communities within international politics and an associated 
discourse which transcends, and permeates, the seemingly static boundaries of a state-
based system.  As Toni Erskine has pointed out, this normative development ought to be 
understood as the natural outgrowth of domestic political theory into the theater of 
international politics.21  She goes on to argue, in opposition to Bull, that this development 
provides an otherwise absent historical background to the emerging discipline of 
international political thought.22  Collectively these works engage with the schema 
establish by Hollis and Smith.  Normative international political thought responds to the 
ethical dilemmas which emerge within an instrumental political framework guided by 
power, authority and insecurity. 
 
Chris Brown’s seminal work International Relations theory: New Normative Approaches 
offers a schematic ordering system of this burgeoning field of normative international 
                                                 
21
 Toni Erskine, Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated 
Communities’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).   
22
 The idea of an disciplinary interest in international political thought is evidenced in the emergence of 
following texts; Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, Nicholas Rengger, International Relations in Political 
Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  This idea is likewise supported through the development of new 
journals which overtly engage in the ideas of political theory, international politics and the history of 
political thought as well.   
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politics.23  He articulates the possibility of cosmopolitan and communitarian frameworks 
and contrasts these approaches with one another.  Communitarian political thought, 
broadly speaking, locates a central role for the community.  It is within this communal 
space that individuals are constituted and the values and ideals which they articulate first 
take shape.  The idea of a communitarian political thought is articulated in the works of 
authors such as Mervyn Frost, Alastair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer.  Mervyn Frost 
adopts a neo-Hegelian framework in order to establish a link between embedded norms 
within the community and a conception of the individual.  Individuals, communities, and 
states, he argues, play a mutually constitutive role which shape and re-shape their very 
being.24  While Frost looks to embedded norms in order to stem the tensions associated 
with the international ideal of political sovereignty alongside the norms of non-
intervention and human rights, Alastair MacIntyre focuses instead on the role of 
traditions in our understanding of what it is to be human.  Traditions emerge from shared 
understandings within the community which gives rise to the values and ideals towards 
which individuals all strive.  They provide a necessary background knowledge which 
gives meaning to the rules and institutions guiding our daily lives.25  Finally, Michael 
Walzer, like Frost, engages with the norm of international sovereignty in order to 
determine when, and how, individuals facing grave danger can be protected.  He situates 
his account of political obligation and responsibility within the community.  It is within 
the community that individuals are provided with meaning in their lives.  Consequently 
                                                 
23
 Brown, 1992.   
24
 Mervyn Frost, 1996; and, “A turn not taken: Ethics in IR at the millennium” Review of International 
Studies, 24 no. 5 (1998), 119-132.   
25
 Alastair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981). 
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when faced with a ‘supreme emergency’ they can act collectively in order to ensure their 
own protection.26   
 
On the other hand, cosmopolitan assumptions originate within the individual who is a 
source of value.  Broadly speaking cosmopolitan thinking highlights a universal 
conception of right and good.  It engages with the fragility of the human condition and  
espouses a commitment to a global community comprised of individual, moral, beings.  
To be a cosmopolitan, according to Martha Nussbaum, is to display a primary allegiance 
to a community of global citizens.27  Likewise Toni Erskine identifies the idea of ethical 
cosmopolitanism which notes that “everyone, regardless of where he or she stands in 
relation to political borders, community boundaries, and even enemy lines, is equally an 
object of moral consideration.”28  This is in keeping with Patrick Hayden’s identification 
of three cosmopolitan ‘moments’.  In his work Cosmopolitan Global Politics he notes the 
centrality of the individual, conceptualized as equal beings, a universal account of 
morality, and a universal interest in the well-being and development of individuals as 
members of a global community.29 
 
Patrick Hayden goes on to distinguish between what he identifies as moral and legal 
interpretations of cosmopolitanism.  The former focuses on the moral equality of all 
individuals qua individuals whereas the latter is keen to promote a global political order 
                                                 
26
 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, Third Edition, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
27
 Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” The Boston Review, (1994), 1-8.   
28
 Erskine, op. cit. 2009, 1.   
29
 Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan Global Politics, (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005).   
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premised on a universal understanding of legal rights and duties.30  Much like Hayden, 
Jeremy Waldron distinguishes two types of cosmopolitan thinking.  Cosmopolitanism, he 
argues, can be located at once in the discourse of political philosophy as well as the 
philosophy of law.  A cosmopolitanism that is rooted in political philosophy espouses a 
utopian ideal and draws on the notion of the polis in order to construct a global moral 
state.  This idea corresponds roughly to the legal cosmopolitanism identified by Hayden 
and challenges the state-centric idea of international politics.  On the other hand, the 
cosmopolitanism he attributes to the philosophy of law draws on the assumptions of 
Immanuel Kant.  According to Waldron, Kant’s use of the phrase, ‘cosmopolitan law’ 
reflects the contemporary ideas of ‘international law’.  Kant, he argues, employed this 
idea chiefly to investigate the intersection of law, justice and right within a particular 
ambit of human life.  As he concludes, for Immanuel Kant, the idea of a perpetual peace, 
and a cosmopolitan right was not cosmopolitanism per se, rather, it was a thesis 
embedded within the idea itself.31   
 
This cosmopolitan distinction is evident in the normative discourses of IR.  Within this 
ethical subset one can further distinguish two differing frameworks.  Liberal 
interpretations, which draw on the original ideas of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice,32 
                                                 
30
 The focus of this critique of cosmopolitan assumptions focuses on the moral and ethical uses of the idea.  
This is not to discount the works of such scholars as David Held and Daniel Archibuggi who use 
cosmopolitan ideas in order to engage with the discourse of world order.  See for instance David Held, 
Cosmopolitan democracy: an agenda for a new world order, (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); or, Daniel 
Archibuggi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008).   
31
 Jeremy Waldron, “What is Cosmopolitan?” Journal of Political Philosophy, 8 no. 2 (2002), 229.  He 
articulates these ideas in order to clarify his original arguments which are evident in the following, 
“Minority Cultures and The Cosmopolitan Alternative” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25 
(1991), 751. 
32
 John Rawls, A theory of justice, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971).   
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employ the rhetoric of rights in order to establish the well-being of the individual.  These 
ideas are best displayed in the works of Charles Beitz33 and Thomas Pogge34 who, as 
students of Rawls, sought to extend justice as fairness beyond the political state.  They 
offer an international ethic which responds to the plight of suffering others throughout the 
world.  Charles Beitz, like the communitarian scholars already highlighted, engages with 
the idea of international sovereignty alongside the possibility of universal human rights.  
His investigation of economic institutions, situated within the state, provides a means of 
developing an account of international distributive justice which benefits individuals, 
conceptualized as members of a global community.  This approach has wielded a 
formidable influence within the wider discourses of ethical international politics.35  An 
understanding of Beitz’s work prefaces an understanding of the ongoing debates of 
justice and morality in the wider discourses of IR.  The relationship of justice and 
economics is likewise visible in the works of Thomas Pogge.  He argues that global 
economic inequality prohibits a realistic engagement with the vulnerabilities of being 
human.  He proposes, in the same vein as Beitz, the idea of distributive justice focusing 
                                                 
33
 His original work is Charles Beitz, Political theory and international relations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979).  His cosmopolitanism is further developed in later publications such as 
“International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Literature” World Politics, 51 no. 2 
(January 1999), 269-296; and, “Social and Liberal Cosmopolitanism” International Affairs, 75 no. 3 
(1999), 515-529. 
34
 See for example, Thomas Pogge, “Real World Justice” The Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005), 29-53; “Severe 
Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties” Ethics & International Affairs, 19 no. 1 (2005), 55-83; World 
Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); 
A Global Resource Dividend” in Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship 
David A. Crocker & Toby Linden, eds., 501-536 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
1988).   
35
 See Nicholas Rengger, “Reading Charles Beitz: twenty-five years of Political Theory and International 
Relations”; Chris Brown, “The house that Chuck built: twenty-vie years of reading Charles Beitz”; David 
Miller, “Defending political autonomy: a discussion of Charles Beitz”; Simon Caney, “Global 
interdependence and distributive justice:”; Catherine Lu, “Cosmopolitan liberalism and the faces of 
injustice in International Relations”; and finally, Charles R. Beitz, “Reflections”  The Review of 
International Studies, 31 no. 2 (2005), 361-423.   
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on the redistribution of global natural resources which challenges the centrality of state 
borders within the international system.36   
 
One can also distinguish a Kantian cosmopolitanism which, like liberal versions, notes 
the vulnerability and frailty of the human condition.  This interpretation highlights the 
autonomy of the individual within the community and is well documented in the works of 
Onora O’Neill.37  Her cosmopolitanism draws on what she identifies as a Kantian Ethic 
which is derived from, but ultimately distinct from, the original works of Kant.38  She 
employs this theoretical framework because, she claims, it takes seriously the empirical 
claims of a Rawlsian influence in moral philosophy but views the centrality of the state, 
its border, and the bounded nature of justice discourses with a degree of skepticism.  
Furthermore, this particular framework sustains an account of human moral agency 
which draws on the ideas of Kantian reason, freedom, action and individual judgment.  
Such an approach, she claims, can facilitate the shifting role of the state and the 
cosmopolitan ideal of universal morality.  These ideas are presented in their most refined 
                                                 
36
 Currently a second generation of scholars who have, in the past, engaged with cosmopolitan ideals, are 
now turning to an alternative work of John Rawls, The law of peoples: with “The idea of public reason 
revisited”, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).  This facilitates an account of a cosmopolitan 
citizen embedded within a community of friendship.  See for example, Erskine, 2009; as well as Catherine 
Lu, “Political Friendship among Peoples” Journal of International Political Theory, 5 no. 1 (2009), 41-58 
and P.E. Digeser, “Public Reason and International Friendship” Journal of International Political Theory, 5 
no. 1 (2009), 22-40.  This idea is challenged by Simon Keller, who claims that the link between individuals 
and their friendships when applied to inter-state relations is dubious and ontologically challenging.  See 
“Against Friendship between Countries” Journal of International Political Theory, 5 no. 1 (2009), 59-74.   
37
 See for example Onora O’Neill “Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice” Review of International Studies, 26 
(2000), 45-60;  Faces of hunger: an essay on poverty, justice and development, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1986).   
38
 There are she claims, three different ways of labeling the works of Kant, and its various interpretations.  
The first, Kant’s ethics reflects the original works he produced.  A second category, ‘Kant’s ethics’ is the 
first round of interpretations of his ideas which, she notes, is distinctly negative in its tone.  A third and 
final category ‘Kantian Ethics’ reflects a discourse derived from the ideas of Kant, but is distinct from his 
original interpretations.  This work is largely positive and has been used within IR to develop a discourse of 
international cosmopolitan ethics.  See Onora O’Neill, “Kantian Ethics” A Companion to Ethics, Peter 
Singer, ed., 175-185 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1991).   
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state in her latest work, Towards justice and virtue where O’Neill seeks to provide an 
account of justice premised on practical reason in order to accommodate both universal 
and particular assumptions of human good.39 
 
Cosmopolitan discourses regardless of their origin, represents the chief response to the 
problems of human suffering and inequality within the theater of international politics.  
Underlying their structural differences cosmopolitanism is united in its recognition of the 
frailty of the human condition and the vulnerabilities which this brings about.  A cursory 
glance within international politics by cosmopolitan scholars reflects the inequalities 
associated with the structures of global governance.  They reveal a deep seated malaise as 
individuals lucky enough to live in a developed and stable state thrive to the detriment of 
other, less able beings.  For cosmopolitan scholars suffering exists within the structures 
and practices of international politics.  These structures are man made and are, logically, 
capable of being changed.  Potentially, they could be restructured in order to better 
address the frailty of the human condition addressing the needs of individuals.  The 
possibility of change is central to the human experience.  It represents, in the wider 
discourses of the history of political thought, the emergence of the modern notion of 
human progress.  It combines the cognitive abilities of individuals, understood as political 
agents, to structure the social world.  Cosmopolitans engage with the notion of progress.  
In so doing they highlight a series of assumptions about the human being.  The idea that 
individuals possess the wherewithal to affect structural change, and effectively deal with 
the contingent factors of being human, is a decidedly modern phenomenon.  It assumes a 
                                                 
39
 Onora O’Neill, Towards justice and virtue: a constructive account of practical reasoning, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).   
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degree of control in the natural world, which in reality individuals struggle to realize.  As 
Cynthia Helpern notes, modern conceptions of the individual assume that human 
knowledge and ingenuity can responsibly address and react to the problems which 
emerge when individuals live together.40  This idea is likewise documented by Niamh 
Middleton.  She notes how the philosophy of the social sciences, loosely based on a 
scientific methodology facilitated an understanding of individuals as autonomous and 
knowledgeable beings.41  Knowledge, it is revealed, empowered individuals who sought 
to limit the contingent frailty of being human in common.  It facilitated political agency 
directed at improving the human experience.    
 
This historical turn had serious implications for moral institutional design.  It was 
assumed that in order to focus on the potential for human progress, an impartial and steril 
institutional design was necessary.  Consequently, human progress came to be associated 
with the public realm of ‘the political’.  This move further entrenched the centrality of 
instrumental relationships to the detriment of non-instrumental relationships.  This, in 
turn, marginalized the social assumptions associated with ‘being political’.  
Consequently, contemporary interpretations of moral cosmopolitanism begin with a 
series of assumptions which sustain an impartial and autonomous moral agent.  This 
individual exists unaware of the wider social assumptions which support his or her moral 
development.  This isolated state challenges effective agency and denies a realistic 
                                                 
40
 Cynthia Helpern, Suffering, Politics and Power: a genealogy in modern political theory, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2002). 
41
 Niamh Middleton, “Aquinas, the Enlightenment and Darwin” New Blackfriars, 86 no. 1004 (July 2005),  
437-449.  This point is likewise noted in Hyn Yol Jung, “Enlightenment and the Question of the Other: A 
Postmodern Audition” Human Studies, 25 no. 3 (September 2002), 297-306. 
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understanding of human vulnerability.  They fail to engage with the idea that suffering 
might just reflect either one of two uncontrollable variables, being social or moral luck.   
 
Discussions relating to moral luck become relevant when sought after ends are not 
achieved.  As Bernard Williams points out deliberative agents may act in a morally 
appropriate manner yet sought after ends may remain elusive.42  At this point one must 
then look beyond the controllable, to the contingent, and ponder the consequences of 
one’s actions.  Are remorse and regret suitable reactions to negative consequences, or 
should individuals continue on, aware that, regardless of the outcome, their reasonable 
deliberations were best suited to the sought after, yet elusive ends?  As Williams points 
out, regret and remorse remain unpalatable in a modern context.  He highlights the central 
assumptions of John Rawls to make his point clear.  His account of deliberative 
rationality does not allow for the possibility of blame and the practical methodology he 
articulates is a sound one.  Morality and luck, within this liberal framework, can not co-
exist simultaneously, in the lives of individual political agents.  It highlights the lack of 
control which individuals have over the natural world and challenges the modern ideals 
of institutional design.   
 
Likewise a Kantian perspective is hard-pressed to accept a role for moral luck in the daily 
lives of individuals.  This ideas is expressed by Thomas Nagel, in response to Bernard 
Williams, when he highlights that virtue, according to Kant, is equally available to all 
individuals.  He acknowledges that it may be more difficult for one individual over 
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another to achieve a virtuous state but his exposition of the autonomous will leading to an 
understanding of the moral law provides an account of the free individual who exists 
outside contingent life factors.43  One can draw parallels between this idea and the early 
writings of Martha Nussbaum who contrasts the tragic and vulnerable experiences of 
Hector, in the battle of Troy with the experiences of Agamemnon who must sacrifice his 
daughter, Iphigenia, in order to appease the Gods and set sail for Troy.44  While Hector is 
aware of the moral tragedy he is experiencing and mourns graciously incorporating the 
experience into his moral trajectory, Agammemnon remains aloof and unaffected.  This 
state of being is unsatisfactory and as the Chorus reveal, his unwillingness to bend to the 
hands of fate requires punishment.  The Fragility of Goodness articulates an ancient 
moral framework revealing an account of human life that is vulnerable and balances on 
the precipice of tragedy.  For Nussbaum, moral experiences are set within the community 
which advances a notion of moral goodness.  This stands in stark contrast to the Kantian 
experience whereby right is an independent standard discoverable through human reason, 
and is not focused on the community.  The autonomy of right facilitates the removal of 
moral luck from the contemporary moral experience in a way that Aristotelian readings 
of the moral life and its contingencies could not.  Her Aristotelian examination of luck 
and tragedy hints at the ensuing account of being political which facilitates the contingent 
and unpredictable human experiences which challenge the ideal of progress.   
 
Moral luck is but one aspect of the human experience that allows for the expression of 
human vulnerability.  Another aspect which demonstrates an individual’s potential for 
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tragedy, and therefore suffering, lies in their social nature.  The idea that individuals are 
naturally social beings is a contested one; however, as this work unfolds the social 
ontology of being human will emerge and with it another related assumption; individuals 
require both instrumental and non-instrumental relationships in order to develop as moral 
beings.  This work highlights the centrality of non-instrumental relationships as vehicles 
of social learning within ‘the political’ which engage with both the public and private 
aspects of the human experience in an equal manner.  It describes how familial 
relationships educate children on social expectations and behavior within the community.  
Likewise, they establish the reciprocal expectations of care and love which help to foster 
a greater sense of solidarity, friendship, and perchance, charity within the community.  
These values and ideals, this work argues, preface an alternative structure and role for 
both the individual and the community which is both ethical and moral and relevant to 
normative IR discourses.  This institutional design does not preface the non-instrumental 
relationships over their instrumental counterparts, it simply reiterates their importance; 
however, in so doing it reveals the vulnerability which modern and contemporary 
institutional designs seeks to limit.  With care, love and friendship also comes the 
possibility of hurt, mistrust, fear which can arise in egotistical situations of desire.  Such 
are the contingent factors which human beings can not control and when left unaddressed 
can lead to the wider consequences of suffering.   
 
The various cosmopolitan institutional designs reveal a proclivity to deny the very 
aspects which unit individuals as beings in common.  The denial of non-instrumental 
relations, and therefore uncontrollable contingencies, within this realm does not afford a 
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realistic means of engaging with what it is to be a human being.  When Nussbaum, and 
inter alia, Williams, speak of moral luck they are asking their readers to grasp the 
sensitivity of living together aware that there are situations in which individuals exercise 
limited control on their outcomes.  When these outcomes are negative, this is referred to 
in many political discourses, as a tragic state.  It is the reality of this experience which is 
recreated throughout this work through the deployment, and defense of a natural law 
account of politics.  This account offers a critical interpretation of international politics 
which allows for a re-engagement with non-instrumental relationships.  Non-instrumental 
relationships, it will be argued, reveal a particular type of knowledge which stands in 
stark contrast to the impartial cosmopolitan individual.  It acknowledges that individuals, 
while founded on a social and moral ontology, are in effect unique beings.  It is this 
individuality which must be addressed within the community if our shared vulnerabilities 
are to be acknowledged.  Until this acknowledgement permeates the wider structures of 
international politics, and the vulnerability of the human experiences is engaged with, the 
tragic nature of international politics will remain and the discourse of moral international 
politics will have, at best, a limited, influence on the ability to accommodate the 
vulnerability of the human condition.   
 
Individuals, regardless of their location, are vulnerable and frail beings.  This 
vulnerability marks the primary means that individuals can relate to each others as beings 
in common.  Our shared vulnerability stems from our need to engage with each other and 
reflects our inherent social nature.  It demonstrates the shared need we all have to live 
within a community of individuals.  These communities reflect both the instrumental and 
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non-instrumental relationships which provide the reciprocal support that individuals 
require to develop and care for others in turn.  A failure to identify and engage with this 
natural sociability limits the possibility for human moral development which in turn, 
limits the possibility of a realistic conception of ‘the political’.  While cosmopolitan 
scholars articulate an understanding of human vulnerability, their supporting assumptions 
fail to offer a means of realistically grappling with the challenge of vulnerability itself.  It 
is the absent social assumptions of being human which facilitate the personal knowledge 
of individuals, in their daily lives and experiences which incorporates the vulnerability of 
the human experience within ‘the political’.  This work reflects an alternative means of 
understanding what it is to be a human being as a social and moral individual.  It situates 
itself within the historical and contemporary conceptions of natural law morality in order 
to move beyond the structural assumptions of the cosmopolitan discourse which, it 
argues, is unable to seriously address the contingent, and particular variables of being 
human within a moral community.   
Suffering is both a natural and political experience.  Its consequences are expressed in the 
daily experiences of being human.  As William E. Connolly points out suffering is an 
ongoing activity.  Particular individuals ‘bear, endure, undergo, or submit’ to experiences 
which limit their ability to develop in a morally acceptable fashion.  To suffer is to 
experience the opposite of joy, comfort, mastery and wholeness.45  As a political 
phenomenon, suffering can be located as the opposite corollary to agency.  It is the 
inability to act and express hurt and pain.  It is, as David B. Morris points out, a silent 
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process.  In order to understand this process one must experience it.  It is 
incommunicable.46  The relationship of agency and suffering is likewise comment on by 
Cynthia Helpern who notes the manner in which both come together.  “Politics sits 
squarely in the middle of that void between active and passive, patient and agent, sufferer 
and deliverer,” she writes.47  One can extend this idea further situating ideas about 
suffering not only within ‘the political’, but also within a moral framework as well.   
 
This is a valuable step beyond political notions of suffering because it facilitates the idea 
that suffering is part of the human experience.  Consequently, any attempt to engage with 
this phenomenon requires an holistic understanding of being human drawing on both 
instrumental and non-instrumental relationships.  Non-instrumental relations provide the 
knowledge to engage with particular instances of suffering aware of the particular 
attributes of individuals within the community.  It demonstrates that responses to 
suffering can be both individual and particular provided the response is couched within a 
wider moral framework.  This twofold approach to understanding and engaging with 
human suffering is facilitated by a natural law framework.  It articulates the absolute ends 
of goodness and the particular ends of human development which provide the sensitivity 
to address the vulnerabilities of the human experience through a particular understanding 
of love and charity.  This approach highlights the most basic aspect of a shared account 
of humanity, our common frailty.  It also highlights the relational nature of the being 
human.  A natural law morality consequently accepts the structural focus of cosmopolitan 
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accounts but argues that the impartialist assumptions of their origins fail to address the 
totality of the human experience and by extension, human frailty as well.   
 
Before moving on to engage more fully with the idea of natural law morality one further 
interpretation of cosmopolitanism must be examined.  Second generation cosmopolitan 
scholars have sought to address the challenges of impartialism and universalism which 
accompany both the liberal and Kantian interpretations.  The ideas of Catherine Lu and 
Toni Erskine reveal a cosmopolitan framework which embeds the individual within a 
particular conception of the community.  This facilitates a reworking of cosmopolitanism 
while simultaneously challenging the dichotomy established by Brown.  Catherine Lu 
attempts to ‘salvage’ the idea of an ethical cosmopolitanism by highlighting different 
images of humanity.  She challenges the utopian critique through an exegesis of human 
vulnerability and the proclivity individuals, as agents, have to do morally evil deeds; 
however, she does not express vulnerability and frailty in isolation.  She is also aware of 
the particularisms which define each individual.  Cosmopolitanism, she claims, need not 
be a homogeneous ethic.  This particularity avoids the challenges of imperialism which 
underscores its universality.  She concludes that cosmopolitanism can be ‘non-idealist, 
non-alienating and non-coercive.’48  These ideas are similarly taken up by Toni Erskine 
who seeks to articulate the idea of embedded cosmopolitanism which not only addresses 
the shortcomings of previous cosmopolitan thinkers but invites otherwise excluded 
scholars, namely, communitarian ethicists into the debates in order to enrich the role of 
the ethical community alongside the individual.  Their works provide many parallels with 
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the soon to be elaborated natural law approach; however, while one can find evidence of 
an improved interpretation of cosmopolitanism, they fail to discuss the relationality of 
human experience which, it is argued, is required in order to address the vulnerabilities of 
being human in common.   
 
Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of Dislocated 
Communities represents a detailed and thought out response to many of the challenges 
faced by cosmopolitan scholars.  It also engages with the manner in which IR proposes to 
study the idea of normative international relations.49  Erskine’s ideas draw on the works 
of many scholars, in particular Michael Walzer, Onora O’Neill, and a group of feminist 
scholars which she labels, ‘different voice feminists’ in order to argue that when 
individuals are conceptualized within particular relationships the idea of geographic 
communities is dissolved opening up the possibility of a porous international ethic.  
Relations, for Erskine, sustain human autonomy and self-sufficiency all the while 
providing an account of the ‘dislocated community’.  Individuals can choose which 
relationships will define who they are and what allegiances and affiliations will be close 
to their heart while other will remain further afield.  This idea of community highlights 
the centrality of shared membership but remains an informal conceptualization.  They can 
overlap, increase or decrease depending on the nature of the individual.  Moreover, they 
are, for Erskine, the primary means of addressing both the impartiality and universality 
critiques of previous cosmopolitan accounts.   
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A cursory glance of this idea seems to improve on previous interpretations; however, at 
the same time alternative challenges must be addressed.  The theme of vulnerability key 
to many of her predecessors and contemporary’s works is all but absent from her 
theoretical framework.  Like Beitz and Pogge, she draws on the asocial individual 
attributed to the ideas of John Rawls.  Owing to this influence there remains an overt 
acceptance of the pre-social self.  Moreover, she brackets human agency from the moral 
experience.  How an individual can embed themselves absent a strong idea of agency 
remains problematic.  Another inconsistency is the manner in which norms and 
instrumental relationships are used to make the case for an embedded community and a 
responsibility to strangers, even during times of war.  Instead of pointing to the 
underlying vulnerability of being human Erskine highlights the legal discourse of the 
Geneva Conventions to add credibility to her claims of partial cosmopolitan ethic.  While 
her notion of community begs for an examination of non-instrumental relationships she 
remains focused on the instrumental relations of formal IR discourses as represented in 
the international laws of war.  Consequently one wonders whether or not Erskine is able 
to bridge the gap established by Brown so long ago.  What emerges from Erskine’s re-
working of the cosmopolitan ethic is in fact a desire to recapture the relationship of the 
individual and the community which typifies pre-modern moral thought.  This 
relationships would provide the elusively sought after unity which Erskine seeks to 
establish though her engagement with the works of communitarian and feminist thinkers.   
 
A natural law framework sustains the elusively sought after unity of ‘embedded 
cosmopolitanism’.  Advocating the morality of natural may seem an unexpected ethical 
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traditional to invoke within international politics.  Indeed, it is understood by some to be 
a less than palatable turn.  Yet it is to the natural law tradition that this work turns in light 
of the previously articulated idea of human suffering.  It notes the vulnerabilities 
associated with both moral luck and an inherently social nature and claims that only a 
framework that articulates an holistic account of being political will successfully begin to 
address the phenomenon of human suffering.  As individuals, we are all linked by our 
common frailty and the possibility of death.  Indeed, death is the ultimate expression of 
moral failure in the presence of human suffering.  A natural law framework addresses this 
most basic of human phenomenon which incorporates the realities of the human 
experience.  It advocates the integration of human non-instrumental relationships 
alongside the formal structures of governance in order to provide knowledge of what it is 
to be a particular person within a larger moral framework.  Consequently it improves the 
impartiality of the cosmopolitan discourses by articulating the idea of persons in 
relations.  It openly addresses the relationship of morality and ethics within international 
politics and engages with the idea of tragedy in IR more broadly.  It provides a response 
through the articulation of an account of moral agency which locates the potential for 
positive action within each and every individual conceptualized as members of particular 
and distant communities.  It assumes outright the social and moral nature of individuals 
and espouses a symbiotic relationship between individuals which reflects a particular 
ordering of the moral community.  The community, on this account, is the end of 
personal non-instrumental relationships structured within an account of moral governance 
engendering institutional patterns which sustain individual identity within the 
community.  It identifies who will care and support us and who we support in turn.   
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A natural law framework also provides a critical standard from which to evaluate current 
political structures and determine if they are meeting the primary needs they were 
originally created to meet.  As this work will reveal, the ends of human happiness, or 
integral human fulfillment, coupled with the particular knowledge gained in through non-
instrumental relationships of love provide a means of evaluating the patterns which 
emerge from formal political structures.  It develops a casuistry of wellbeing drawing on 
a re-articulation of the ends of universal human rights while simultanesouly challenging 
their current liberal interpretation.  The value of a pre-modern natural law framework lies 
in the challenge it mounts against the impartiality of modern liberal political thought and 
the contemporary political subject therein.  Likewise, it is skeptical of the ideal of human 
progress and its centrality in the task of institutional design.  Instead, it focuses on the 
idea of human engagement.   
 
This final focus on human engagements, and relational being, distinguishes this natural 
law account from its cosmopolitan cousins.  The pre-social origins which Erskine 
identifies, and are visible in other scholars as well, do not necessitate an associated 
account of agency at the outset.50  Owing to the relationality of human beings and the 
epistemic relationships of thought and knowledge, a natural law interpretation offers an 
account of agency, and individuals, as moral agents alongside and within an unfolding 
natural law interpretation of being political.  It is the possibility of agency which allows 
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for a critique of current institutions as well as the possibility of future change.  It is the 
possibility of change which drives this work.  It seeks not to engage in the debates of 
suffering per se, but rather, having identified the problem of human suffering and 
locating its place within the formal structures of international politics through an exegesis 
of cosmopolitan discourses it seeks instead to propose an account of international politics 
which engages with the possibility of moral institutional design in light of man’s inherent 
vulnerabilities which emerge when individuals are simultaneously conceptualized as 
social, moral and necessarily political beings.   
 
Chapter One moves quickly beyond the cosmopolitan works identified in this 
Introduction and locates alternative accounts of tragedy in International Relations.  It 
does this through an examination of political philosophy and international political 
though documenting the loss of non-instrumental knowledge within domestic 
institutional design and the discourse of international law. It offers an historical account 
of political and moral philosophy beginning with the enlightenment.  It then highlights 
the challenges posed for more modern interpretations of international politics and the 
changing relationship of ethics and morality within the discipline itself.  This is achieved 
through a formal investigation of the contemporary idea of tragedy in international 
relations and draws on a wide range of authors who exist within the peripheries of the 
realist discourse in IR. 
 
Chapter Two proposes the idea of a natural law framework.  As was documented in this 
Introduction, the natural law framework is decidedly pre-modern and focuses on the 
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relationality and vulnerability of the human experience.  Yet Chapter Two is concerned 
with addressing the criticisms of natural law within the formal discipline of IR.  It offers 
an historical overview of the tradition before demonstrating the presence, albeit a hidden 
one, within contemporary debates of IR through the distinction of thick and thin ideas of 
natural morality.  Chapter Two establishes the presence of natural law in international 
politics and goes on to show how an assimilation of thick and thin accounts is possible 
owing to the work of the ‘New Natural Lawyers’.  It challenges their interpretation but 
offers at the same time a defense of the theological criticisms highlighted by English 
School Scholars, in particular Hedley Bull.  It draws on the Papal Encyclicals and the 
philosophical ideas of Weber in order to demonstrate that faith reflects ideas and that 
ideas are central to the human experience.  Moreover, it demonstrates how this notion of 
faithful politics can inform contemporary international politics when one seeks to offer a 
realistic appraisal of the human condition. 
 
Chapter Three builds the necessary framework needed to adopt an account of politics in 
which instrumental and non-instrumental relationships feature as equal and prominent 
sources for institutional patterns.  It draws on the ideas of Thomas Aquinas in order to 
articulate an account of the natural law individual and locates these ideas in his original 
ideas of natural law.  It builds on the interweaving of thick and thin natural morality in 
order to demonstrate that within his works Aquinas provides a vision of the community 
that supports agency and challenges the centrality of the state in International Politics.  It 
articulates an account of being human premised on the potential of human development 
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in order to espouse an account of political obligation and responsibility derived from the 
idea of love.    
 
Chapter Four draws out the nuances of the natural law account of love.  It uses this idea 
to offer an account of the natural law agent alongside the community espousing the ideals 
of civic friendship when it is coupled with the natural dominion of the Salamanca 
Theologians.  It concludes through an account of the order of charity in order to 
demonstrate the possibility of an unbounded account of international politics.  This 
facilitates the development of fluid and dynamic institutional patterns which 
accommodate the idea of individuals conceptualized as agents of justice.  It highlights the 
possibility of commutative interpretations of justice, as opposed to distributive accounts 
located in cosmopolitan discourses and shows how this idea complements the 
relationality of being.  It situates this work alongside pre-existing feminists debates about 
care and shows how the natural equality of being which features within the morality of 
natural law can offer insight into the possibility of relational politics.   
 
This work draws to a close by demonstrating how, in the end, the morality of natural law 
can affect the structures, practices, and traditional ideas of international politics.  It begins 
with a description of ‘the international’ in order to demonstrate the possibility of an open-
ended account of international politics.  This facilitates a non-territorial account of the 
political community.  This is followed by an acute critique of human rights and provides 
instead, a natural law response.  This facilitates the development of a casuistry of 
wellbeing which demonstrates the feasibility of collective moral agency.  The Chapter 
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concludes through an articulate of ‘the personal’- an informed account of international 
politics which engages, one final time, with the vulnerability of being human, in 
common.  It notes that individuals are fallible but reiterates that when situated within the 
proper moral structures there is a possibility to do goodness, but that individuals can at 
times err, and in such instances the possibility of human suffering is greater.  
